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The history of technology in Spain’s two remaining American colonies in the nineteenth 
century has been largely neglected by the specialized literature. The paucity of scientific 
and inventive activity by the Spanish Empire and its technological dependence on the 
industrialized countries from the second half of the eighteenth century onwards seemed 
to be the main reason of this lack of interest. Likewise, the ubiquitous presence of sugar 
might have ‘sweetened’ and simplified the way in which historians tackled issues 
relating to the Spanish Caribbean plantation economy.
1 This situation differs from the 
increasing research on the historical relationship between technology and colonialism 
that has been published over the last two decades. This recent scholarship has 
illuminated how the networks of technological exchange globalized to an extent in the 
nineteenth century such that they included the colonial world.
2  
In contrast to the myriad literature on technology and colonialism in the British 
and French worlds, the history of technology in the Spanish Caribbean has received 
relatively little attention, despite its importance. The scant literature on the 
technological changes within the nineteenth-century Cuban plantation economy has 
mostly paid attention to the relationship between technical improvements and slave 
labour.
3 Recent research, however, has revealed the relevance of the efforts by the 
Creole elite to promote the modernisation of the Cuban sugar industry. Among others, 
recent works by Alan Dye, Jonathan Curry-Machado, Reinaldo Funes, Stuart McCook, 
Pedro Pruna and Dale Tomich have shown how modern machinery and organisational 
innovations were disseminated in nineteenth century Cuba.
4 These new studies have 
also examined the measures adopted by Cuban institutions so as to promote scientific 
advancement, such as the commissions to study foreign technological progress, the 
creation of research laboratories, the setting up of advanced botanical gardens and the 
proliferation of scientific and technical societies. Furthermore, some of these works 
have stressed the role of British and American technicians and engineers in this 
modernisation process. As Curry Machado has shown, these foreign technical experts 
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acted in Cuba as ‘sub-imperial’ agents in the process of technical change of the sugar 
industry.
5 Herein the term ‘sub-imperial’ refers to the nineteenth century Cuban internal 
process of economic and technological liberation from the metropolis before the 
attainment of political independence in 1898.  
This paper offers an overview of a vast recently born research project that results 
from the confluence of three lines of research: Spanish patent history, Cuban 
commercial history and the modern history of technological globalization. More 
specifically, this paper studies the nature of the Cuban Innovation System
6 through the 
analysis of the functioning of the Spanish patent institution at the colony. Section one 
examines the technological and institutional evolution of Cuba during the nineteenth 
century. This section will summarize how Spanish colonial institutions in charge of 
fostering technological innovations acted in the overseas territories in a very different 
manner to how they did in the metropolis. Cuban institutions such as the Junta de 
Fomento, Real Consulado or Sociedad Patriótica de Amigos del País were more active 
in promoting technology transfer than their equivalents in metropolitan Spain. These 
institutions acted in Cuba as ‘sub-imperial’ institutions that were administered 
independently. They were taken over by the Creole Elite of sugar planters to favour 
their interests: the investment in technology and the increase in exportations. Section 
two offers an overview of the particular characteristics of the Spanish patent system 
overseas by focusing on Cuba as the most important Spanish colony of the nineteenth 
century. The analysis of the practical management of the Spanish patent institution 
overseas yields an understanding of the increasing nineteenth century extension of 
patent systems throughout the North Atlantic economies and the colonial world.
7 This 
process led to a progressive globalization of markets for technology and the 
mushrooming of international patent agencies which facilitated transfers of 
technological information to Cuba. Finally, section three offers an interpretation of 
foreign patenting activities and technology transfer in the Cuban sugar industry in the 
late nineteenth century. This section stresses the role of hacendados (sugar-mill owners) 
as agents of diffusion of foreign patented technology in Cuba. In the nineteenth century, 
sugar planters acted as the chief agents of technology transfer, establishing agreements 
and partnerships with foreign inventors and mechanical manufacturers. Therefore, the 
Cuban patent system, as a ‘sub-imperial’ institution, was linked to the world economy 
through ‘sub-imperial’ agents. These agents connected the Cuban sugar industry to the 
international networks of information and knowledge exchange.   3
In the last decade, economic historians have provided extensive knowledge as to 
the functioning of the Spanish patent system throughout nineteenth century.
8 These 
works have shown that Spain was, throughout this period, extremely dependent on 
European technology in developing its own industry. However, patent dynamics 
overseas are still largely ignored. Before 1898, metropolitan Spain and Cuba had the 
same patent legal regime, but their practical management seemed to have been rather 
different. Similarly to other Cuban institutions in charge of the promotion of economic 
development, the Spanish patent system became progressively self-governed. These 
independent institutional practices in nineteenth century Cuba led to the establishment 
of an autonomous ‘Colonial Innovation System’ before the political separation of Cuba 
in 1898. The Cuban innovation system consisted of ‘sub-imperial’ institutions that 
helped to insert the Cuban economy in the global networks of technological exchange.
9 
These autonomous institutions favoured technology transfers beyond the capacity of 
Spanish control. In this context, patent networks were a relevant vehicle for the 
transmission of technological knowledge and information to the colonies. 
 
Sugar, Technology and Institutions 
 
From the end of the eighteenth century and throughout the first half of the nineteenth 
century, Cuba entered the international world market thanks to its specialization in 
sugar production and its inclusion in the international network of technological 
exchange. Cuba filled the void left by the French colony of Saint Domingue
10 after the 
1791 slave rebellion. This fact, added to the increasing international demand for sugar 
as a result of the industrial revolution and the ensuing globalization, forced Cuban sugar 
planters to reduce costs progressively in the wake of the arrival of new competitors such 
as sugar beets and new producing countries such as Java, Formosa or the Philippines.  
The Spanish, European (especially the British and French) and the United States 
customs policy also shaped the future of sugar export.
11 Yet, to explain the remarkable 
transformation that turned Cuba into the world’s largest sugar producer, it is necessary 
to understand the important role played by Cuban institutions in promoting measures, 
namely technological policies, that allowed the specialization in a sugar monoculture 
economy. These Spanish colonial institutions acted on the island very differently from 
how they did in the metropolis. Our hypothesis is that these ‘sub-imperial’ institutions 
were more active and immersed in the international networks of technology exchange,   4
as well as more connected to the recent globalized international market than the 
metropolis.  
  Three aspects explain the process through which Cuban creoles achieved this 
economic and technological independence. First, Spain was not as large a sugar 
consumer as England. Therefore, the metropolis was not a market for Cuban sugar.
12 
Second, Spain was not a great re-exporter of colonial foodstuffs. Third, Spain could not 
offer the technology required by the sugar industry due to the lack of refineries and 
scientific and technological expertise. The elite planters had thus to find their own way 
to access the globalized market and to bring advanced technology to the island. 
  How did planters succeed in biasing commercial Spanish rules? Cuba was an 
agricultural colony with a clear specialization in sugar monoculture, with a few other 
subsidiary goods, such as coffee and tobacco. As it dedicated the greatest part of its 
land, human labour and capital resources to sugar production, the island was highly 
dependent on foreign trade, both to sell what it produced and to meet its food needs 
such as wine, flour, jerked or dried beef, and so on. Lacking a qualified craft industry, it 
also had to import manufactures. The Cuban economy grew by increasingly binding 
itself to the exterior. The island elite managed to take advantage of the situation through 
the enactment of a tariff system and the use of neutrals.
13 The authorities of Havana 
faced this set of circunstances with successive licenses for trading with neutrals –and 
with the repeals of these- and decided to act independently,
14 thereby ignoring the 
orders coming from Spain and allowing the entrance of United States businessmen 
whenever they believed it to be appropriate.
15 This was one of the means of legalizing 
contraband. The assault of Havana from England (1762) is considered to be a turning 
point. Spanish policies turned back to liberalization beginning in 1765 in order to 
attempt to expedite business relations between the metropolis and the colonies.
16 
However, the incapacity of the Spanish military forces to control smuggling and to 
maintain sea trade in times of war opened maritime trade to foreign nations. The royal 
decree passed on the 18 February 1818 allowed Cuban free trade with foreign nations,
17 
given the constant complaints and difficulties in maintaining regular trade.  
The second problem related to commerce was customs tariffs. In general, 
custom duties were high and brought many fiscal revenues to Spain. This was the only 
way for the metropolis to receive any fiscal revenue from sugar planters, given that the 
Cuban fiscal system was based on indirect taxes. Planters were not only exempted from 
several indirect taxes,
18 but also from the unique direct tax –the diezmos-
19,  a privilege   5
that other primary industries such as cattle breeding did not enjoy. In addition, they 
obtained the exemption of customs duties in the importation of utensils for the 
agriculture and reductions in tariffs related to machinery. Planters also maintained a de 
facto prohibition of the transfer of debt of their ingenio at least until 1843.
20 Even if the 
Spanish custom tariff policy regarding Cuba was quite complex,
21 it was obvious that 
there was complicity between the elite and the colonial authorities, which was also 
reflected in the modification of the assessments. For instance, Ramón de La Sagra,
22 a 
Spanish naturalist and politician, explained how a committee formed by planters, 
merchants and members of the colonial administration met yearly in Havana to look 
through custom duties.
23 Indeed, the Royal Decrees of the 4 February 1822 and the 25
 
March 1825 became the most effective tools to change assessments and to act beyond 
the Spanish rules. 
However, not only did planters manage to have sway over Spanish trade rules, 
but they also promoted the transfer of technology. The main Spanish colonial 
institutions throughout  the end of the eighteenth century and the first half of the 
nineteenth century, such as the town council, the Real Hacienda or the Real Consulado 
–which was renamed Junta de Fomento in 1832-, worked together to promote 
agriculture and import every type of modern apparatus and innovation that would 
benefit the sugar industry. The Count of Ricla and a group that Le Riverend
24 called the 
‘first reformists’, which included Captain General Luis de las Casas and the planter and 
politician Francisco Arango y Parreño, supported the development of Cuban agriculture 
and above all the sugar culture.
25 These institutions, especially the Junta de Fomento
26 
and the Economic Societies,
27 clearly prioritized the planter’s interests over the 
metropolis’ concerns, acting as autonomous institutions within the Spanish 
administration. The Economic Society of Havana in turn created diverse entities that 
encouraged the transfer of technology. Examples of these are its Public Library
28 
(1793), The Botanical Garden (1817) –it promoted a Botany School (1824) and 
established the first Chair and Chemistry Laboratory (1819)-
29, the Junta Central de la 
Vacuna and  the School of Mechanics (1845). The Society also published its own 
conscientious reports
30 and several journals such as the Papel Periódico de La Habana 
and the Revista Bimestre Cubana (1831), where the planters spread their opinions and 
circulated technological advances. Observing the names of the sugar planters belonging 
to these institutions, we discover that most of them were present in more than one: 
Pedroso, Diago, O’Farrill, Peñalver, Herrera, Betancourt, De Escovedo or VillaUrrutia.   6
Some institutions were created thanks to networks of active planters such as the Real 
Consulado de Agricultura y Comercio, which was established on the request of 
Francisco de Arango y Parreño.  
Through all of these ‘sub-imperial’ institutions, Cuba managed to access the new 
advanced technology available in the rest of the West Indies, the United Kingdom, 
France, Belgium and the United States before metropolitan Spain did. Therefore, 
several expeditions were financed by the Junta de Fomento to see in situ all the 
techniques put into practice in Europe and in the rest of the colonies in the Caribbean,
31 
so that they could be applied in Cuba. The source of patented technology was found in 
foreign countries and not in the metropolis. Some of the most advanced technologies 
were registered and introduced in Cuba before introducing them in metropolitan Spain. 
Indeed, the most widely used to illustrate this is the railway.
32 It was devised by the 
Economic Society, the town council and Real Consulado of Havana in 1830.
33 As early 
as 1837, the first railway line in Cuba, which travelled between Havana and Bejucal, 
was opened.
34 It was also the first one in Latin America and it was introduced on the 
island a decade earlier than in metropolitan Spain. Something similar occurred with 
another communication system, the telephone, tested first in Havana in October 1877 
rather than in metropolitan Spain.
35 Less known is the partnership between the inventor 
Thomas Edison and the Basque businessmen José Francisco Navarro in order to set up 
the firm ‘Edison Spanish Colonial Light Company’ in New York in 1881, later renamed 
‘The Havana Electric Light Company’.
36 This company was set up in Havana with the 




The Metropolitan and Colonial Patent Systems in Nineteenth-Century Spain  
 
Another significant example of how Spanish institutions functioned rather differently 
overseas than in metropolitan Spain was the patent system. During the ‘Ancien-Regime’ 
the Spanish Monarchy as well as other European powers made use profusely of Royal 
privileges of invention, introduction and manufacturing monopolies to promote 
innovations. The first of this kind of concessions was granted in Madrid in 1478 and, 
together with government posts or monetary awards for new technologies, remained the 
only system to encourage invention and innovation activity in an increasingly 
competitive mercantilist atmosphere up until the beginning of the nineteenth century.
38   7
Those privileges were also bestowed on Spaniards or foreigners for the protection of 
new technologies in the Castilian dominions throughout the Modern Era. Thus, many of 
them, especially those associated with mining, were granted for the American territories 
through the Consejo de Indias between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.
39 Yet, 
contrary to that of England and France, Spain never passed a general law regarding their 
concession, which was arbitrary until the early nineteenth century. 
  The final crisis of the ‘Ancien Regime’ at the end of the eighteenth century and 
the independence movements in Spanish America brought about the end of the Empire, 
accompanied by a complex process of liberal revolution that lasted until at least 1833. 
As occurred with other property rights, there was a rather rapid transition from 
traditional Royal privileges of invention to modern regulations concerning industrial 
property.
40 The 1811, 1820 and 1826 patent laws
41 inaugurated a new era of regulation 
of inventive activity in Spain, which was soon extended to its remaining territories 
overseas: Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Indeed, the origin of the first modern 
Spanish patent law is to be found in Cuba. The 1820 law –the first one to be completely 
Spanish, as the 1811 Decree had been passed by the French government of José 
Bonaparte– was enacted as a consequence of the insistent demands of the Cuban 
inventor Fernando Arritola, a mechanic from Havana. Arritola’s request to patent ‘a 
new and improved still’ reached the Spanish parliament, where it was debated. The 
Cuban high authorities, the General Captain and the Governor of Havana, supported his 
demands. The new liberal Parliament of 1820 accepted Arritola’s request and decreed 
the new patent law, which was slightly revised in 1826 under Fernando VII’s new 
government.
42 
The Royal Charter of the 30 July 1833
43 officially extended the Decree of the 27 
March 1826 on patents of invention and introduction to the three mentioned overseas 
islands, although after 1820 some modern patents had already been granted in Cuba or 
the Philippines.
44 Nevertheless, that legal extension was necessary to specify some 
significant points, especially related to Cuba, where: 
 
“Art. 2: Attending (its) particular state, non-encouragement is necessary in order 
to promote the agricultural industry, principally in sugar manufacturing, because 
both planters and institutions are paying much attention to foreign advances, 
taking and adopting machines, instruments, artefacts, processes and scientific 
methods; thus privileges are limited in Cuba to inventors and improvers, and 
introductions go beyond the discretion of the Gobernador Capitán General and 
the Intendente, (…) after hearing the Council, the Junta de Comercio o Fomento   8
and the Sociedad Económica, to establish (…) the industrial or agricultural 
sectors and districts in which there must not be (that kind of) privilege.  
 
The rest of the Royal Charter of 1833 practically reproduced the 1826 law, 
thereby setting up the general rules by which inventions and new technologies would be 
protected in Cuba and the other islands. They would grant patents for Spaniards or 
Foreigners; for completely unknown mechanisms or processes in the case of inventions; 
for 5, 10 or 15 years duration (5 for introductions); conditioned to a compulsory 
working clause within one year after the concession; after paying a quite expensive 
fee;
45 and with the usual requirements for official publication, assignments record, 
expiration statement, property right infringements and judicial penalties.
46  
These nineteenth century laws introduced a patent system formed by different 
‘subsystems’. Each of the different subsystems had, in practice, their own patent and 
trademarks offices. The ‘Real Conservatorio de Artes y Oficios’ in Madrid was created 
to obtain monopolies in metropolitan Spain, while the ‘Juntas de Fomento’ were in 
charge of patent protection in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Half of the patent 
fees collected by the ‘Juntas de Fomento’ overseas had to be sent to the Conservatorio. 
This in fact quadrupled the cost of patent protection in all the Spanish territories insofar 
as it was necessary to obtain four different patent titles. For this reason, the majority of 
Spanish patents obtained in Madrid for the Peninsula seemed to have never come into 
effect in Cuba Puerto Rico or the Philippines as it was costly and not usual to extend the 
property rights to overseas, except in some few sugar technologies.
47 On the other hand, 
there also had to be hundreds of patent applications and grants in Cuba, directly 
administered within the island, whose technical information did not reach Madrid. 
Cuban institutions just sent a list of patents to control the payments from time to time. 
All of that suggests, up to a certain point, an autonomous conception of the patent 
management in Cuba that could facilitate capturing the institution by the Creole elite 
and using it by both local rulers and ‘sub-imperial’ agents in a rather different manner 
than in metropolitan Spain. Evidence in the same direction is that the Royal Charter of 
1833 was not published in Spain until 1849.
48  
The 1880 Royal Decree on industrial property extended the 1878 patent law to 
‘overseas provinces’.
 49 The administration of patent rights remained autonomous in the 
colonies in the same way in which it had been established previously. However, from 
that moment on, the patent fees had to be paid once and the extension to overseas 
territories (or vice versa) was free, although agent costs continued to make the operation   9
expensive. The Royal Decree of 14 May 1880 maintained the autonomous 
administration of the patent system in Cuba due to “the substantial delay that patent 
administration from the Peninsula would cause… Art. 6: Patents of invention which 
have to only and exclusively be used in the overseas provinces will still be granted by 
the respective Gobernadores Generales, in the same way it is currently established, 
although overseas patents could easily be extended to metropolitan Spain by an 
uncomplicated free application.
50 In 1897, just before the Cuban war, another Order 
indefinitely widened the period (four months) to send those applications from overseas 
to the Peninsula because of continuous post delays among Ministries.
51 
As Table 1 demonstrates, less than 4 percent of patents applied for by domestic 
residents and presented in the Madrid register between 1820 and 1898 were from Cuba. 
The percentages vary according to the decade and that of 1830s must be highlighted, 
when almost 27 percent of domestic patents were registered by Cuban residents, 
probably in response to the Royal Charter of 1833 being enacted. Nevertheless, after 
1840, patents from Cuba seem to practically disappear until the 1880s, when the new 
law of 1878 was passed and extended to Cuba, allowing overseas applicants the free 
extension of their rights to the Peninsula, as we have seen above. That meant an 
immediate rise of overseas applications in Madrid of almost 5 percent up until their 
independence.  
Our interpretation notwithstanding, an in-depth understanding of the patent 
system is still necessary. Historical patent records in Havana strongly suggest that two 
distinct patent system were employed in the Spanish empire during the nineteenth 
century: a metropolitan system in Madrid and another in Cuba in the form of a 
particular ‘Colonial Innovation System’. We have found, for instance, that 
approximately 4,000 patents were directly registered in Havana between 1830 and 1880, 
which practically represent 40 percent of all patents granted in the whole Spanish 
Empire in the same period.
52 That amount of registered patents in Havana during the 
nineteenth century situates the island at the top of the ranking of all innovative areas of 
Spain before the independence. Further research will provide a better understanding of 
patenting activity in both sub-systems. For example, how difficult the previous 
technical exams to grant a patent were compared with those of Madrid,
53 how other 
‘sub-imperial’ institutions (Junta de Fomento, Sociedad Económica) captured the 
system beyond the metropolis limits to promote technological changes and sugar 
industrial expansion, or how British, French and very often Anglo-American   10
technicians and the Creole elite used the patent protection system. Yet we can already 
affirm in this overview that, whilst Catalonia was ‘the factory of Spain’, as the 
economic historian Jordi Nadal has asserted,
54 Cuba seems to have been its laboratory 
and technological workshop, and as has commonly occurred with many laboratories, 
scientists and technicians in Spanish modern history, Cuba also wound up in exile. 
 
Crossing Empires: Foreign Patenting Activities in the Cuban Sugar Industry 
  
During the nineteenth century the Cuban plantation economy underwent a remarkable 
transformation. The Cuban cane-sugar industry became, from mid-nineteenth century 
onward, a modern tropical enterprise. For instance, by 1870 Cuba produced thirty 
percent of the total world market of this commodity.
55 In a context of increasing 
competition in the world sugar market, Cuban planters managed to transform their 
former small-scale slave plantations into large agro-industrial complexes. As Moreno 
Fraginals has asserted, there was a ‘jump from manufacture to big industry’, a sort of 
‘sugar industrial revolution’.
56 Both production levels and productivity multiplied 
exponentially.
 This process of modernization and industrialization of sugar production 
cannot solely be explained by the expansion of the sugar frontier, a fertile soil and an 
ideal climate. Nor can it be explained by the use of coercive labour before the abolition 
of slavery in Cuba in 1886. The technical changes and organizational innovations 
introduced in the mid-nineteenth century also had a critical role in this significant 
change. During those years, Cuban sugar mills became the most technically advanced in 
the world.
57 Cuba emerged as an advanced industrial region where sugar planters, sugar 
masters and prominent businessmen were aware of the latest innovations and 
participated in transnational networks of commercial and knowledge exchange. The 
introduction of modern refining techniques and estate railways in Cuba followed well-
defined patterns. Technology was not introduced via the Spanish metropolis. On the 
contrary, the inter-imperial and inter-colonial technological exchanges were far more 
important. In developing its sugar industry, Cuba thus became extremely dependent on 
technology from rival Atlantic Empires.  
  The relative importance of technology transfer mechanisms varied considerably 
throughout the nineteenth century, from relatively informal ones, such as the direct 
migration of skilled engineers at the middle of the century, to the implementation of 
more formal technical institutions such as patents rights in the last decades of the 
century. Similarly, the nature of technical improvements evolved during this period   11
from the diffusion of steam-powered artisanal grinding mills to the assembly of large-
scale and capital-intensive steel machinery. The shifting nature of technological 
relationships in the late nineteenth-century globalized economy and the wave of 
science-based innovations associated with the second industrial revolution had also an 
important impact on how sugar machinery was transferred to Cuba. Technology transfer 
through patenting turned out to be more noticeable in the 1880s. In late nineteenth 
century Cuba, foreign patent activity became routine for economically valuable 
inventions in a context of increasing corporate capitalism. Before that date, expert 
migration and the circulation of technical literature appeared as prominent transfer 
mechanisms. However, as patent records show, the transfer of patented technology to 
the Cuban sugar industry and auxiliary sectors is as old as the institution itself. From the 
1820s onwards, some of the most economically valuable technologies, or ‘elite’ 
inventions, using Ian Inkster’s terminology,
58 transferred from advanced economies to 
Cuba were channelled through the Spanish patent system. These transfers were carried 
out through either the metropolitan office located in peninsular Spain or, mostly, the 
Cuban patent register. As we have seen above, the latter office was based in Havana and 
functioned, in practice, independently from the metropolis. Interestingly, the diffusion 
of technical information contained in the patents granted at the Cuban patent ‘sub-
institution’ was regularly published in La Gaceta de La Habana. 
An example of an early attempt to usher patented technology into Cuban 
plantations is the introduction of Derosne’s Vacuum pan. This refining system was first 
set up in 1841 on La Mella, a  sugar estate owned by Wanceslao de Villaurrutia. It was 
the inventor himself, the prominent French chemist Charles Derosne, who provided all 
the machinery and supervised the assembly of the new system in Villaurrutia.
59 
According to the United States Patent Office, the Derosne installation bought by 
Villaurrutia cost $32,000.
60 The crop of May 1843 was the first one made entirely with 
the new apparatus. According to a report by Villaurrutia on the performance of 
Derosne’s new ‘sugar machinery’ on the 1843 crop, the new system of vacuum pan 
evaporation significantly saved labour and reduced charcoal consumption.
61 However, 
the initial investment was considerably higher than was required for technically inferior 
vacuum boilers. The new system reduced dependence on slave labour but needed skilled 
labour to operate it. In their 1844 treaty describing the new method, which was 
translated to Spanish by the renowned Cuban Chemist José Luis Casaseca, Derosne and 
Cail recognized that the new apparatus needed a skilled sugar master to operate it; yet,   12
they also underlined that the new mechanical system simplified the tasks of unskilled-
slave labour.
62 It was Derosne himself who trained Villaurrutia’s technicians to use the 
new innovation. 
Derosne and his business partner Jean François Cail, a French boilermaker, had 
already secured the patent right of his invention in France and Britain, thereby amassing 
a small fortune in sales of the new invention. In 1836, the two men established the firm 
‘Derosne et Cail’, which by the middle of the century would become one of the world’s 
foremost sugar machinery manufacturers.
63 After the successful introduction of the new 
vacuum pan in Cuba, Derosne and Cail tried to secure the property rights of their 
apparatus also in the Cuban patent ‘sub-system’. In June 1842, they applied for a 
fifteen-year ‘royal privilege of invention’ to Havana’s Junta de Fomento. Their agent in 
Cuba was Joaquín de Arrieta a sugar planter who acted as intermediary in the 
application process to obtain this patent. In introducing Derosne’s apparatus in 1843 in 
his ingenio ‘Flor de Cuba’, Arrieta acted not just as an agent but also as a business 
partner. The patent application was officially rejected by the Havana’s Junta de 
Fomento y Agricultura. The reasons put forward to reject patent rights on this invention 
were two-fold. First, it was argued that, according to Spanish law, the new technology 
had been already introduced on the island. Second, Cuban institutions such as the Junta 
de Fomento and Real Sociedad Económica, had already invested significant capital in 
order to introduce Derosne’s invention in Cuba’s sugar mills.
 64 
  Although Derosne’s patent application was rejected, this episode yields an 
understanding of the patenting activity and transnational operations of foreign sugar 
machinery manufacturers in the Spanish Caribbean plantation economy during the mid-
nineteenth century. Cuban sugar planters and engineering firms based in New York, 
Paris, Liverpool and Glasgow began to be closely interconnected during those years. 
Steam engineering and manufacturing companies like the British Fawcett Preston, the 
North American Novelty Iron Works and the French Derosne et Cail were some of the 
most important suppliers of the sugar machinery in Cuba.
65 Although the political ties 
were maintained with the declining Spanish metropolis, the technological links were 
drawn with the most industrially advanced Atlantic empires. In a period of accelerated 
globalisation, the most industrialised nations began to dominate the trade of modern 
industrial technologies in the Caribbean. Cuban planters, through their ‘sub-imperial’ 
institutions, were inserted into an international network of technology circulation in 
which patent activity became, along with technical journalism and expert migration, a   13
major vehicle of knowledge dissemination. As the international patenting of valuable 
inventions progressively became routine in colonial settings, western manufacturers of 
refining equipment begun to actively protect and commercialize their innovations in 
Cuba. 
  It was during the two last decades of the century that an increasing number of 
complex sugar technologies ranging from industrial chemical processes to capital-
intensive mechanized mills were channelled through the proprietary system. From the 
mid-nineteenth century, American and British companies had begun to introduce the 
overwhelming majority of machinery used at central sugar factories in the Spanish 
Caribbean. Only French firms managed to compete with Anglo-Saxon machinery 
manufacturing companies. Firms such as the Glasgow-based Duncan Stewart & Co. and 
the French firms Compagnie de Fives Lilles, Société Anonyme des Anciens 
Établissements Cail and Frères Brissoneau et Compagnie made an extensive use of the 
Spanish patent system. Once their patents had been secured, those firms could go ahead 
in their manufacturing and exporting activities or eventually commercialize the patent 
rights in Cuba. This pattern would seem to confirm Ian Inkster’s statement that from the 
mid-nineteenth century ‘securing patent rights was very often a prelude of technology 
transfer by active change agents’.
66 
  The 1880s and 1890s were a period of great technological turnover in the Cuban 
sugar industry. In the face of a crisis stemming from increasing competition from beet 
sugar producers and the extension of sugar cane plantations to new regions, Cuban mills 
initiated a merging and modernization process. The total number of sugar estates was 
significantly reduced and Cuban mills became the largest in the world. The change in 
the business size was closely associated with the introduction of technical and 
organisational innovations related to the second industrial revolution.
67 In this context, 
the incentives for patenting modern technology related to sugar cane exploitation 
increased. Machinery producers and engineering firms in Europe and the United States 
had one of their largest markets in Cuban sugar plantations. The control and 
management of patented technology in colonial settings became hence fundamental. In 
this context, active transfer agents, from patent professionals to businessmen, not only 
carried technological information from rival empires to Spain, but they also assisted 
inventors in the commercialization of patented technology in the colony. 
As the number of patent applications for Sugar technology rocketed, patent 
agents and other intermediaries transferring inventions to Cuba multiplied. Foreign   14
machine and engine manufacturers required agents who were experts in the 
particularities of Spanish regulations and administrative procedures in the colonies. 
Agents guided and assisted foreign patentees in registering, publicizing and 
commercializing their inventions in Cuba. Agent’s assistance in mechanical drawing 
had already become essential around 1870. The extension of patent rights to colonial 
territories was a lucrative activity. For example, Moss and Company, the largest 
nineteenth century patent agency in the United States, began publication of the journal 
La América Científica e Industrial in New York in 1890.  This technical journal 
advertised services to extend patent rights to Spanish-speaking countries. The Cuban 
economy and the improvement in sugar technology were highlighted contents in this 
journal.  
An agent who worked intensively for foreign manufacturers, including Duncan 
Stewart and Fives Lille, was the renowned lawyer Julio Vizcarrondo.
68 A Puerto Rican 
based in Madrid, Vizcarrondo was an important politician, senator and one of the 
leaders of the slavery abolitionist movement. He began practising as an agent in 1875 
and founded the intellectual property agency Elzaburu, still one of the largest agencies 
in international patenting and trademarks application in Spain.
69 The patent activity of 
the Sugar machinery manufacturer Duncan Stewart and Co. is a good example of 
Vizcarrondo’s role as an intermediary in ‘colonial patents’. This machinery 
manufacturing company, based in Glasgow, used the service of Vizcarrondo’s agency in 
several of its patent applications in the Spanish overseas territories. For instance, in 
April 1887, Vizcarrondo presented in the Madrid Register the application for a patent of 
introduction for ‘an improvement in sugar mills’.
70 Vizcarrondo supported Duncan 
Stewart in the patent application process, translated the technical memorandum and 
arranged the necessary mechanical drawing services. A year later this agent would also 
assist Duncan Stewart to officially certify that the new invention was put into practice in 
Cuba, following the legal requirements of the 1878 Spanish patent law extended to 
Cuba in 1880. The new mill was set up in the ‘Soledad’ sugar estate, a large modern 
central property owned by the Boston firm E. Atkins and Company and one of the first 




In the course of the nineteenth century the institutions that made up the 
Innovation System in the Spanish colonies experienced a progressive independence.   15
Although still constrained by political and legal ties with declining metropolitan Spain, 
these overseas institutions which devoted themselves to fostering the modernisation of 
colonial industries began to be controlled by Creole elites. The preliminary findings of 
an ongoing research on the circulation of technology in nineteenth century Cuba has 
revealed that it was actually colonial elites who controlled these institutions in their 
objective to promote the transfer of technological innovations to the island. Cuban 
institutions such as the Junta de Fomento and the Sociedad Económica were dominated 
and administered by sugar mill owners, who managed to place the Cuban plantation 
economy within the global networks of technological exchange. This situation was not 
inevitable but a conscious decision on the part of the Creole elite, given that 
metropolitan Spain was unable to provide the necessary technological innovations. Like 
other colonial or post-colonial sugar producers such as the British West Indies, Brazil, 
Hawaii or Java, Cuba had to look abroad for its technology. However, there is a 
significant –albeit hardly surprising– contrast. Whilst in these other colonies or formerly 
colonized nations the metropolis supplied an important part of the technology, as well 
as the capital and experts necessary for its introduction, in the case of the Spanish 
Caribbean colonies the role of the metropolis was highly irrelevant. Inter-imperial 
connections smooth away the obstacles of the ‘Spanish Innovation System’ to develop 
indigenous technical capabilities through the setting up of a ‘Colonial Innovation 
System’ and autonomously administered ‘sub-imperial’ institutions. 
This picture appears clearer when we look at the patenting activity in the Cuban 
‘sub-system’ and at the model of institutional organization of the patent administration 
itself. Although our knowledge of the functioning of the Spanish patent system overseas 
during the nineteenth century is still incomplete, this paper has offered a tentative 
explanation of patent activity and management in colonial Spain. From the study of 
nineteenth-century industrial property law concerning the colonies and the original 
historical patent records in Havana and Madrid, we suggest that Cubans self-
administered the patent institution at the island. Furthermore, the high number of patent 
applications, both in Madrid and Havana patent offices, which protected inventions in 
Cuba indicates that this colony was, at least between 1830 and 1880, the most 
innovative Spanish ‘province’. In 1880 the extension of the 1878 patent law to the 
overseas territories introduced significant practical changes. Patenting activity in Cuba, 
however, seemed to have remained relatively higher than in other Spanish ‘provinces’ 
until 1898. The increasing commercial prospects in the Cuban and Puerto Rican   16
plantation economies during the last two decades of the century led foreign 
manufacturing firms from advanced economies to systematically protect their 
inventions in the Spanish system, either through metropolitan patent offices or directly 
at the Cuban patent ‘sub-institution’. Foreign and corporate patent activity in Cuba 
reveals that the view of empires as bound entities cannot be sustained. Technology 
transfer and patent dynamics in nineteenth century Spanish colonies can only be 
explained as the result of a larger interacting system whereby rival empires acted as 
‘shadow’ metropolis.   17
 
Table 1: Patents recorded at the OEPM in Madrid  
applied for by Spanish residents (1820-1898).  
 









 Cuban residents 
% 
1820-1829 2  1  2  89  2.2 
1830-1839 40  3  0  148  27.0 
1840-1849 15  18  1  451  3.3 
1850-1859 5  22  0  902  0.6 
1860-1869 2  1  0  1,021  0.2 
1870-1879 7  1  0  1,022  0.7 
1880-1889 174  7  3  3,645  4.8 
1890-1898 254  8  9  5,420  4.7 
TOTAL 499  61  15  12,698  3.9 
 
Source: Archivo Histórico Nacional y Gaceta de Madrid for privileges from 1820 to 1826. Between 1826 
and 1898: Original documents of patents at the Oficina Española de Patentes y Marcas (OEPM). 
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